East?West and North?South Relations by Szentes, Tamas
East- West and North-South Relations
Tamas Szen tes
Peace in the Third World is endangered at several
levels: by the arms race on the world level, by foreign
military interventions, by regional wars, by militari-
sation at the national level and by two 'invisible wars',
namely, that which manifests itself in mass misery and
hunger; and that which has brought about the
deterioration of the natural environment and the
exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources.
European colonialism made such a lasting impact that
many local wars and regional conflicts still have their
roots in the colonial legacy: particularly those
stemming from boundary problems, separatist
movements, and manipulated nationality or religious
divisions. Cultural colonialism is responsible for the
erosion of many valuable cultural traditions and
thereby for the loosening of the forces of intra-society
cohesion. And the 'invisible war' against poverty and
hunger is mainly the consequence of the socioeconomic
structures which have developed in the peripheries of
the capitalist world-economy.
Over and beyond this historical responsibility of
Europe for colonialism and the rise of the centre-
periphery relations, let us see how post-World War II
developments and the split of Europe into two groups
of countries with opposite socioeconomic systems
have influenced the peace and security of the Third
World, and how the resulting East-West conflicts have
interacted with conflicts between the global economic
centre and its peripheries.
However, we need to be cautious when using the
concepts of 'North-South' and 'East-West' relations,
which are terminological simplifications that can
sometimes conceal or even falsify the underlying social
relationships. Neither term is interpreted by inter-
national journalism and political science to refer to
specific geographical regions. Rather, they are used to
characterise differences, on the one hand, in the level
of economic development, and, on the other, in types
of social system. By applying different criteria to the
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various parts of the same world, these classifications
conceal system specificities such as those within both
the 'North' and the 'South' as well as development
differences within both the East and the West.
Another ambiguity is that usually the 'East' includes
only the socialist countries which belong to the
Warsaw pact, while the 'West' is applied to all the
developed capitalist countries, whether they are
members of NATO or not.
Centre-periphery relations can be reduced neither to
colonialism nor to the quantitative 'development gap'
between advanced and underdeveloped countries.
They involve functional relations of asymmetrical
economic dependence in various forms, which are
supplemented by or provide a basis for foreign
political, military, technological and cultural influence.
As the centre-periphery dichotomy stems from the
uneven development of the capitalist world-economy,
and is rooted in the unequal structure of the world-
wide social relations of production, the conflicts which
derive from it, both between the centre and periphery
and within the latter, cannot be fully solved without
structural and institutional changes and without a
substantial modification of production relations on a
world level. Normally these conflicts take the form of
conflicts between countries or groups of countries.
The central issue seems to be national sovereignty, not
only in the political and legal, but also in the economic
and cultural senses. As a result, primarily national
interests seem to confront each other. Nevertheless
behind these national interests there are different
social or class forces, standing to benefit or lose from
the prevailing structure of centre-periphery relations.
The historical contradiction between capitalism and
socialism originates in the capital-labour antagonism
of the world capitalist system, i.e. from the dominance
of accumulated 'dead' labour, capitalised by a class,
over the 'live' labour of others. Socialism in theory
would emancipate labour, i.e. eliminate the dominance
of capital and introduce a single rule of distribution
according to labour in the whole society. However, as
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a consequence of uneven development within the
world capitalist system, socialist transformation
orginated neither directly at the world level nor in the
developed countries. Instead, it first started in
individual less developed, peripheral or semi-
peripheral countries. Their socialist development has
been inseparable from the struggle for national
emancipation and has in consequence been modified.
And since the rise of socialist systems within a national
framework also implied changes, but only partial
ones, in the global system, the dialectics of mutual
effects necessarily modified both capitalist and
socialist systems.
Though East-West relations are represented as a
conflict between socialism and capitalism, materialised
in two groups of countries, i.e. as a class conflict
centred around the issue of social emancipation, in
reality, and despite all the system-differences, pro-
capitalist or pro-socialist forces are not allocated
according to national or 'bloc' frontiers. Moreover,
national interests often interfere with, reinforce or
weaken conflicting social class interests. Thus
identification of the historical struggle between
capitalism and socialism with the conflict between two
groups of countries, in particular, between the two
military 'blocs', is an inadmissible over-simplification.
During the Cold War a sort of negative-sum-game has
developed of which the arms race is but one element,
though undoubtedly the most decisive. While the Cold
War itself did not originate solely in system-conflict,
but also in the context of centre-periphery relations
and in reaction to Third World nationalism, it has
directly and indirectly affected the development and
the security of the Third World. It has done so by
exteriorising the East-West confrontation, thus
reinforcing the process of militarisation in the Third
World. In addition, it has transplanted the development
patterns which arose in the two Europes under cold
war conditions. These have neither followed, in the
case of Western Europe, simply from the 'pure logic'
and inherent tendencies of the development of
capitalism, nor have they followed, in the case of
Eastern Europe, merely from those of the socialist
transformation. They have also reflected the impact of
the Cold War itself and have thereby reinforced
tensions and conflicts within and between Third
World societies as well.
It would be too easy, but hardly well-founded, to
present not only the Third World but also Europe as
victims of the superpower game. The paradigm of
'bipolarism', which identifies the historical struggle of
the two social systems with the confrontation of the
two military blocs is itself a product of the Cold War.
It is misleading not only because of its over-
simplification of the historical contradiction of social
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systems and the actual differences between the two
superpowers; but also because of its neglect of the
interactions between East-West and North-South
relations and their effects upon internal changes
within the Third World, including the effects of the
latter in turn upon the superpowers' own policies -
not to mention the role of other European powers in
East-West and North-South relations.
The Cold War confrontation which developed, after
World War II thus partly reflected and partly induced
the divergence between Eastern and Western policy
toward anti-colonial liberation movements. Since
then, practically all political changes within the Third
World have been reinterpreted in the context of a
bipolar world, as shifts in East-West power relations,
thereby calling forth reactions by the major powers. In
Third World societies this polarisation of very diverse
political forces according to Eastern or Western
orientation, has aggravated the consequences of
internal disintegration, has often opened new sources
of conflict, has hindered national integration and has
obstructed regional cooperation.
Owing to the linkages between domestic and global
political forces, minorities have found it easier to seize
state power in many Third World countries. This
refers not only to puppet regimes established in the
process of decolonisation by neocolonial forces, but
also to the many other regimes arising from coups-
d'état and political instability, which have sought
external backing. The external relations of internal
political forces have become a part, often a decisive
one, of the domestic power game.
What is worse is that under the protection of foreign
powers, political regimes feel much less need to form
domestic alliances and to make constructive compro-
mises with the forces of opposition. This often gives
rise to a tendency toward over-radicalisation which in
many cases is aggravated by the real or assumed fear of
military intervention by the opposite foreign power.
This over-radicalisation leads, as a rule, to unrealistic
economic policies, to the over-politicisation of social
and culture life, to coercive, administrative methods of
conflict management, to an over-expansion of the
security forces and to an excessive role of the state and
within it, of the army.
In this context there are, of course, substantial
differences between left-wing and right-wing regimes.
Yet all too often the former try to reach goals which
would otherwise be beneficial without democratic
participation and contrary to given conditions of
reality. Furthermore, over-radicalised and anti-
democratic left-wing regimes also aggravate social
tensions and can all too easily pave the way for right-
wing government.
East-West polarisation also creates obstacles to
regional integration or cooperation in the Third
World, supplementing the divisions stemming from
the colonial legacy, such as the boundary conflicts and
the divergences brought about by cultural, linguistic,
commercial and monetary ties with different colonial
metropolises. Marked asymmetries deriving from the
latter have been partly replaced - or rather
complemented - by a pattern hardly less asymmetric.
If some countries in a region reorientate their trade
and communication towards the East, demonstrating
the chance for the others to do the same, this
contributes to the diversification of international
relations, widens the developing countries' room for
manoeuvre, improves their bargaining position and
may provide a way out of economic blackmail and
political pressure from the West. Nevertheless, it
remains based on uneconomic long-distance com-
munication and it may impede intra-regional
cooperation. Thus it is hardly the most rational way in
which to restructure the international division of
labour.
In spite of all the benefits developing countries gain
from technical assistance, and despite their improved
bargaining position after the ending of former colonial
monopolies, the influence of foreign experts and- the
training abroad of the first generations of the
intelligentsia, often have disintegrating effects -
especially when East-West rivalries are transferred to
the country or region concerned. Differences in the
education of the elite within a region or the successive
generations of the national intelligentsia do not
promote social cohesion.
The divided, heterogenous and outward oriented
nature of domestic political forces in developing
countries has provided many opportunities for foreign
powers to manipulate them against each other, even
independently of East-West competition. An obvious
example is when weapons are sold by the same military
power or by allies within the same military bloc to
both the government and rebel forces in a developing
country or to countries waging a local war against
each other. Support to opposed forces in Third World
countries has often been related to rivalries within the
West itself, and not to the East-West confrontation.
Under these conditions it is much easier for armed
conflicts in the Third World to spread. Since the
Second World War there have been well over a
hundred regional or local wars in the Third World
[Kende 1980], many of which have also been linked to
the East-West confrontation, either in the sense of
having been stimulated by arms exports, or in the
sense that armed conflict has been displaced from
Europe (where a direct military clash would cause a
nuclear holocaust) to the Third World. These so called
'limited' local wars have in reality caused enormous
damage to human life, to productive capacities, to
economic and social infrastructures and to the natural
environment.
The gravest consequences are suffered by the least
developed countries, due to their smaller 'load-
bearing' capacities, and to the structural specificities
of their 'underdeveloped', peripheral economies
[Szentes 1983]. The growth of the military sector tends
to intensify structural distortions and thereby to
reinforce external economic dependence - being
accompanied by balance of payments problems,
cumulative indebtedness and inflation, Insofar as it
also tends to be associated with the growth of the
'modern' enclave sector, hindering the transformation
of the 'traditional' sector, by extracting surplus and
resources from the rural economy, it also reproduces
socioeconomic disintegration.
There are, of course, great differences in the actual role
played by the army in these countries: whether it acts
as the protector of the interests of ex-colonial or
neocolonial powers and their local allies, or as the
protector of national sovereignty and the pioneer of
nation-building and development. Hence the economic
and socio-political performance of military regimes
varies greatly [Wolpin 1981]. A sharp distinction has,
indeed, developed between progressive, populist,
leftist military regimes and reactionary, rightist
military dictatorships, often associated with support
by different foreign powers. In spite of these
variations, however, it is arguable that military
governments of both the left and the right, are more
coercive, less responsive to the demands of their own
people and less capable of organising development
than their civilian counterparts.
The Cold War confrontation has also left its mark on
the development pattern chosen by developing
countries. The latter's orientation towards the East or
the West has often implied the adoption of
appropriate 'models' of development from Eastern or
Western Europe which in turn reflected the abnormal
conditions of the Cold War. The Western model is
organised to highlight the superiority of the capitalist
economies over the collectivised ones of the 'East',
contrasting Western consumerism with Eastern
producerism, while still relying on the cheap resources
of the Third World. lt has built up a consumer society,
whose development, despite its linkages with a
Keynesian system of state intervention, has been
attributed in conventional theory and in dominant
ideology to a now extinct laisser-faire capitalism. The
new technologies which resulted from the post-war, or
rather war-induced revolution of science and
technology, and which reflected the prevailing factor-
endowments of the most advanced countries in the
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West, were mistakenly regarded as applicable in all
countries of the world.
There is no need to explain in detail how disastrous
efforts to copy this model in the Third World - under
conditions substantially differing from those in the
West - have proved to be. All too often the
demonstration effects of business-manipulated
Western consumerism have induced local elites to
increase their demands for luxurious imports or to
implement policies of import-substituting industriali-
sation. The consequent economic disequilibria have
been manifested in high inflation and indebtedness,
the widening of rural-urban gaps, the acceleration of
social differentiation, the marginalisation of the
masses and the alienation of a narrow elite, leading to
an explosive accumulation of social tensions.
As regards the Eastern European model, which also
became the object of imitation in a few countries, it
actually reflected that early stage of socialist
transformation of Eastern Europe in the 1950s. In
addition to fundamental changes in ownership
relations, in socioeconomic structure and in the class
content of political power, the latter was also
characterised by cold war isolationism, autarchic
economic policies, over-centralisation, forced
industrialisation, prioritisation of heavy industry, an
artificially high rate of accumulation and quantitative
growth, over-restriction of market forces, detailed
central planning, an expanding bureaucracy and over-
all state control in all fields of social life.
Social reality in Eastern Europe itself, however, has
moved on since that time. Both theory and practical
policy have revised the model of the l950s. The latter
had been in sharp contradiction to classical Marxist
ideas about social self-management and the ultimate
fading-away of the state. However, it has continued to
influence the ideology and political practice of all too
'socialist-oriented' developing countries. Many of
these have fcund themselves copying an inappropriate
model of socialist transformation as a consequence of
trying to break away from the capitalist world-
economy, despite their strong structural ties with it; or
forcing the pace of accumulation and industrial
investment, despite low income levels and rural
underdevelopment; or centrally planning economic
activities without the required basis of information.
This copying of inappropriate models has under-
standably led to very unfavourable consequences
which have included trade and payment imbalances,
serious production bottlenecks, severe shortages of
basic consumer items and the proliferation of state
bureaucracy and of administrative regulations. The
problems have sometimes been so severe that they
have undermined the social and political base of the
regime.
42
Third World counteractions to the polarisation
between East and West and to the imposition of
inappropriate development models, have on occasion
been just as one-sided and irrelevant. They have
sometimes manifested themselves in a sterile Third
Woridism, turning against modernisation, industriali-
sation and urbanisation and refusing all the results of
European culture, science and technology. The simple
substitution of a North-South bipolarism for the East-
West one, irrespective of the differences in social
systems within each, is clearly inadequate. It also
neglects the interactions between North-South and
East-West relations which are such a crucial
component of the current crisis. Despite the historical
importance of the Declaration and Action Programme
to establish a New International Economic Order
(NIEO), these documents and the related UN
negotiations seem to have reflected an inability to
understand and take account of such interactions an
inability which in part explains the failure of NIEO
itself.
On the other side of the coin, the relatively short-lived
and inconsistent process of détente was largely
confined to Europe with hardly any attention being
given to possible implications for the 'South' -
though there have of course been some exceptions,
such as the Reports of the Brandt Commission, or the
Soviet proposal to devote part of the financial
resources released by military reductions to develop-
ment assistance. Yet détente brought about important
changes in East-West relations, some of which have
proved irreversible. The 'iron curtain' between the two
Europes has been gradually lifted, diplomatic
relations, including those between the two Germanies,
have been normalised, tourism has developed, and in
many fields economic, technological, scientific and
cultural cooperation between Eastern and Western
European countries has been achieved. Hence even the
dramatic worsening of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the late 1 970s and early
l980s has not led Europe back to the Cold War.
Nevertheless détente failed to break the image of
bipolarism on both sides. Political changes originating
in the context of centre-periphery relations continued
to be conceived as shifts in the East-West struggle.
National movements and liberation struggles in the
Third World still tended to be viewed in the West as
one-sided successes for the Soviet Union. As a result of
being interpreted as violations of agreed principles,
they soon undermined the basis for Soviet-American
detente.
Demands for a NIEO, in sum, tended to be viewed by
the major capitalist powers either as an East-backed
attack against the West or merely as a Third World
issue. At the same time the South was inclined to
interpret détente and East-West rapprochement as a
sign of the unity of the North, or at least as a
compromise at the expense of the South, something
which would weaken its bargaining position.
But the zero-sum-games of East-West and North-
South relations have been in fact negative-sum-games.
This has become ever more apparent in the light of the
present global crisis. Thus if both sides in Europe wish
to contribute positively to the peace and security of the
Third World, their task is 'not simply to return to the
path of Helsinki, but to return to the path of a new
world order' [JanUs 1983: 121 that is, they must not
only promote peaceful intraregional cooperation
between countries of different social systems and the
mutual disintegration of the two military blocs. They
must also work for the gradual elimination of centre-
periphery relations, national emancipation and social
progress in the Third World, and the establishment of
a new, democratic and demilitarised world order.
References
Janos, Peter, 1983, 'Some lessons of the preparation for the
Helsinki Conference', Hungarian Studies on Peace Research,
Budapest Academy of Sciences
Kende,Istvan, 1980, 'Local wars 1945-1976',inAsbjornEide
and Marek Thee (eds), Problems oJ Contemporary
Militarism. Croom Helm. London
Szentes, Tamas, 1983. 'Economic effects of global militari-
sation'. Development and Peace, vol 4 no 1
Wolpin, Miles D., 1981, Militarism and Social Revolution in
the Third World. Landmark Studies, Allanheld Osmun,
Montclair (NJ)
43
